Foreign Affairs: 2014

Could there be a dialogue with ISIL?:  Some commentators, recently, have started to make suggestions about the potential for dialogue with IS/ ISIS/ ISIL and whether such a dialogue would be feasible and also whether it could sit well with the prevailing democratic mandate.

There has been contact, recently, with the Taliban – in the form of a Qatari ‘embassy’ station - which has enabled contacts between the Taliban and those fighting against, no doubt as well as the potential for covert contacts between western intelligence agencies and Al-Qaida (although these could be more discreet dialogue – to arrange prisoner swops, etc).. To go to a further stage – making contacts with IS/ ISIS/ ISIL – would require a number of factors to be in place, amongst which are; a sufficient stalemate (or overwhelming balance of power on one side) that means talks are inevitable, a willingness on both sides to determine a political outcome, the assent of the populace behind the organisations (democratic or otherwise) and sufficiently neutral territory to enable discussions to occur.

While these factors may have, eventually, come together in areas of conflict (such as Northern Ireland in the late 1990s) it is unlikely that they will, for many years to come, in the case of IS/ ISIS/ ISIL.  At the moment, the ‘West’ is playing something of a “catch-up” – having been taken by surprise at the speed with which ISIL developed – and, although more powerful in absolute terms, is relatively behind in the tactical and strategic arenas (such as; social media, spread – or counter spread – of ideology and use of regional resources, such as oil). Neither side is looking at a political outcome – ISIL rejects ‘western’ concepts of statehood, diplomatic/ legal norms and the entire philosophy that underpins much of the prevailing political discourse - and, correspondingly, the West struggles to find any way to engage with the rejectionist philosophy that groups such as ISIL espouse. Most Western democratic populace are not encouraging their governments to talk to ISIL (or Al-Qaida) – there are no mass demonstrations in support of or demanding talks with those groups – and, given almost 15 years of conflict overseas, the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan are too near at the moment for what would be seen by many as a capitulation.  It will take at least a generation – by which time one side or the other may have prevailed – for the political will to be there to engage in talks. Lastly, neutral territory is increasingly hard to come by. Switzerland – the country of choice for European or African leaders to engage in dialogue – is unlikely to meet ISIL requirements. A Middle-Eastern country that perhaps is not overtly Sunni or Shia-dominated could be sufficiently neutral and acceptable to both sides – but it is a struggle to consider one that would fulfil the criteria!

Ultimately, in the near and medium terms, dialogue with ISIL (at least overtly) is incredibly unlikely. In the longer term it is a possibility – but there may be a very different geo-political landscape by then.                                                                                           [6 January 2015]

• Talking Turkey :  With IS/ ISIS/ ISIL at the borders of Turkey, the ‘far-off’ war in the Middle-East/ Syria/ Iraq is getting closer to the European home.. For Turkey, which has had a somewhat porous border for some time, it could be argued that the seeds of previously allowing a flow of fighters to travel into Iraq and Syria from Turkey are coming home, as fighters (on all sides) are now testing the boundaries of Turkey.

   

  If IS/ISIS/ISIL were to breach the borders of a NATO Turkey – in effect threatening Europe – then the next response would be an escalation of the current loose coalition against IS/ISIS/ISIL to a much broader NATO reaction against IS/ISIS/ISIL. This could spark much wider impacts in an already volatile and interconnected regional conflict, with Russia – for example – increasing its threat level in response to a NATO mobilisation (and, perhaps, taking steps to intervene to support Assad in Syria). Should this occur, there is a risk – at least in Syria – that NATO forces could be facing, or at least acting against, Russian-backed Assad allied military forces.  [30 Nov 14]

• Responsibility to Protect?: The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ has become more widely publicised recently. What does it mean? In general, in foreign affairs, it refers to a doctrine that is used as justification for intervention – usually by a State – in the affairs of or on the ground in another country in order to protect people who might otherwise come to some harm (or be at risk of some harm). There are more nuanced definitions but, as a generic explanation that encapsulates the meaning.

  Recent examples have included; Western intervention in Iraq to protect the Yazidi minority & interventions in sub-Saharan Africa to protect groups at risk of genocide or torture.

  The idea of a cross-border ‘Responsibility’ suggests that previous norms of State Sovereignty can be overridden, albeit temporarily, if there is a compelling reason that trumps the sovereignty of a country’s border.. In practice, it is the intervening Organisation or State that decides what is sufficient reason and who should be protected.

  The notion does however raise a few intriguing questions such as; what is the new role for the UN/ Security Council (having been seemingly bypassed by this doctrine) in light of this country-level activity?, would such an intervention be likely or condoned if the reverse of the current pattern occurred (eg. a developing country seeking to intervene in a developed country)? and how far can the concept be stretched (viz. the Russian State’s claim to allow intervention where Russian-speaking people are living)?

  Once the Genie has been let out of the Diplomatic bag it will be very difficult to reverse. [6 Oct 14]