Intelligence and Security: 2014

Report into CIA activity over the last decade: The recently published Senate report into the activities of elements of the CIA makes for interesting analysis. To start, the fact that a report – however redacted and incomplete – can be compiled by one organ of the State into another is significant, especially given the nature of the report and the agency under review. Such publicity into an area of the usually hidden world of intelligence gathering and clandestine activities is strikingly unusual. Certainly, there are major reviews into specific discrete events (think of the ‘Supergun’ affair in the UK and commission of enquiry into Iran-Contra in the US) – but a wide ranging, very public and highly critical analysis of the strategy / philosophy of a particular paradigm of CIA activity and the policy behind it is unique.

Moving to the content – it indicates that the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ used were (a) ineffective, in many cases (b) potentially occurring outside of the procedural limitations, in some cases and (c) probably running contrary to the “spirit” of the US Constitution, if not the strict letter of US law (as defined by in-house lawyers).

For the CIA, the rebuttal is that such procedures were sanctioned – in spirit and in law – at the highest level, were necessary to prevent threats and provided proof that a hard line was being taken in the war against terrorism. Israel has often cited the “ticking bomb” scenario – where ‘enhanced interrogation’ might extract information that could prevent a morally potentially more reprehensible scenario (the killing of innocent civilians, for example).

In a world of absolutes (or ideals) there would be no ‘ticking bombs’, no ‘enhanced interrogations’ and no questions over the moral (or legal) rights and wrongs of actions.. In the world of pragmatism and realism such questions are legitimate, valid and can lead to praise or punishment for those that carry out such activities. On an individual level, distant from relevant information and facts, it can be all too easy to abhor (or, the converse, condone) what is done by individuals acting as agents the State. Until we are faced with the reality, none of us are likely to have to make the choice to not act – or act – but the certainty is that once done the effects are indelible, one way or another.                                                                                                [6 January 2015]

• We are at war: In effect, we (the “West”) are at war. Although not an overt war – as with World Wars One or Two – with a defined enemy or enemies, specified battlefield or battlefields and a fairly clear indication of when one ‘side’ or another has ‘won’ - it is nevertheless clear that there is an ongoing war (that definition, in itself, could be debated) that has been in place for some years.  Following the end of the “Cold War” – itself including many proxy and covert conflicts between the main protagonists – there were, in geopolitical terms, no clear opposing paradigms in International Politics for a few years. The US (and the “West”) had ‘won’ – communism, in the form of the USSR had been defeated – and the US/ West were the dominant (or remaining) philosophy.

  Then something changed. From – approximately – the mid-1990s, the US (and others) found itself fighting on a number of fronts: Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, etc. In isolation, these battles – with warlords, ethnic leaders and national presidents - were not specific and seemingly not connected. No common driver could be discerned – except, perhaps, that battles were (in the main) either brought against US interests or were instigated/ led by the US. The US – being the remaining superpower – found itself being attacked by (and leading action on) a variety of fronts.

  This developed – before and, very clearly after 9/11 – into a coalescence of (mainly militant/ extremist ideological) Islamic groups (Taliban, Al Qaida, ISIS, Al Shabab, Boko Haram, Ansar al-Islam, etc) versus the US and those with common interest.. While non-US sympathetic countries (Russia, China, etc) have not been the per se targets of these groups they are certainly not seen as allies in a fight against the US and the West. As such, it is not a two-way conflict as seen in the Cold War – rather it is the radicalised Islamic groups, effectively, versus the rest (to varying degrees) in discrete conflicts.

  While a formal war has not been declared (realistically not feasible against, in the case of ISIS, a “state” that is not recognised) there is no doubt that in any other circumstances the heightened intelligence, security and military footing that Western countries are on would be just one or two notches short of that occurring in a state of all out conflict. The USA has for many years declared ideologically, indicated legally and acted subsequently against any real or perceived threat across the globe – with no recognition of state borders. In essence this has meant a de facto state of war is ongoing – which its Western allies are participants in.                              [30 November 2014]

• Proxy Wars: Once again – as occurred in the Cold War – we are seeing Global proxy wars taking place. This time, however, it is not the USA v USSR but amongst others; USA/ EU v Russia (in Ukraine), USA & others v IS/ ISIS/ ISIL (in Iraq) and Militant extremist Islam v others (in parts of Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia).

  Taking the first – Ukraine – it could be analogous to the Proxy wars fought by the US in Central and South America during the 1960s, 70s & 80s. If we imagine Putin’s Russia as the US, with Ukraine playing the role of a divided state in South America then the separatists would be the ‘US’ sympathisers in our South American metaphor. Putin’s insurgents would echo the role played by the CIA (albeit with a more overtly militaristic dimension) and the EU as Southern parts of South America looking on and wondering where next the US (ie. Russia) will look to covertly annexe. If you follow the analogy then it suggests we are in for a long process of testing the geographic boundaries and political allegiances on the border with Russia.                                                       Turning to Iraq, the overt injection of; air strikes, ‘non-lethal’ supplies, observers and other non-combat assistance, to Kurdish forces and Iraqi forces (if requested) is indicative of the importance placed by the US on the fight against IS/ ISIS/ ISIL in Iraq. Notably, until recently, no intervention in Syria had taken place – suggesting that the mirror of an attack on IS/ ISIS/ ISIL (ie. that it would, in a “zero sum” scenario, effectively assist Assad & the Shia) was too high a price to pay & the US was better placed to ‘wait on the side-lines’ for each to degrade/ destroy the other. However, just as in Vietnam (and the Korean War) the US can only play a covert/ proxy role for so long and air strikes have occurred.. At some point, in addition, boots may be drawn on the ground.                  Lastly, Militant extremist Islam is taking the proxy war to the West (or Western sympathetic/ allied nations). From the post-Afghanistan rise of “franchise” Al- Qaida, which saw AQ in the Levant, Maghreb, Iraq, Indonesia, Pakistan, etc, the ISIS iteration has taken on the smaller-scale terrorist cell structure and broadened out to a more structured and overt presence. Whether – beyond Nigeria – it replicates elsewhere is to be seen, but one proxy war in Iraq may be enough for those fighting against it.                                                                                             [6 October 2014]