Russia: 2014

Economic Woes: The sanctions imposed on Russia, combined with capital flight/ a devaluing Rouble and an Oil price crash, are having a significant impact. Putin himself has recently indicated that, at the current projections, a two-year downturn may be likely.

As most politicians/ heads of state are aware, to keep the populace ‘on side’ requires either coercion or a benign economic environment (or, at least, expectations of this to come). Putin’s approval – publicly – is still high, few would be prepared to criticize overtly, but it would require a not significant pivoting (most probably from the middle/ oligarch classes) to swing momentum the other way and for Putin’s years of popularity to begin to sway.

While crime is not out of hand, inflation is creeping up and the interest rate increase (from 10.5% to 17%) will add to the economic gloom for many.. A rise in the world oil price – perhaps through OPEC bowing to internal pressures and restricting supplies – combined with a relative easing of the Rouble’s downward trend would reduce some of the pressure but, in the long term, only a dialogue regarding Ukraine  (and other issues) will loosen the non-market derived pressures (ie. Sanctions) that Putin has more control over.                                                   [6 January 2015]

• War and Peace: Given a choice, a rational leader would generally prefer a state of peace – in order to advance trade, build external ties and develop mutually beneficial treaties – than a state of war. Such a sweeping statement requires some justification, but – for now – the main argument in favour of this is to use the metaphor of the rational person in society: greater advancement is usually obtained through being in good relations with one’s neighbours, working at a job and generally abiding by the conventions of society. Certainly some, by operating outside the law or general consensus, might have better opportunity or reward – but, in the vast majority of cases, the opposite is true.

  So it is, transcribing the ‘rational’ man in society argument to global politics that a State which is in constant conflict with its neighbours and others, which restricts or declines to trade and generally ignores the “norms” of its peers is unlikely to prosper and develop as well as if the converse were true. A marauding nation – building an Empire – may have been successful in achieving its aims in the past (eg. The Roman Empire) but in the modern era – as the empire of the United Kingdom and, more recently, the cultural, economic and political sweep of the United States has shown – while some hard power is needed to reinforce dominance, the soft powers of; diplomacy, trade and culture can have as good as if not often more influence than the more war-like attributes of a State..

  For Russia, this suggests that a return to hostile activities (most recently in Crimea/ the Ukraine, but also with potential military training manoeuvrings off the coast of Sweden and in the air near mainland Europe) will be unlikely to achieve – in the long term – the aims that could be better achieved through actions such as diplomacy, trade and cultural activities. The latter was shown in the hosting of the Olympics – but trade has waned, as sanctions have tightened, and Russia is out in the cold, on the world stage, having been ejected from the G7+1/ G8 forum.

  To reverse this process, should it wish to, more of the soft power tactics suggested above – and less of the hard power/ militaristic ones – would be more likely to aid Russia’s return and transition from a warlike peace to a more advantageous state of global relations. [30 Nov 2014]

• Through Putin’s eyes: How can we assess the events that are taking place in Ukraine? One approach could be to put ourselves in the place of Russia’s President and critically analyse from his standpoint. Over the decade or so that he has been either President or Prime Minister, the global downturn has occurred, the US and allied forces have withdrawn from Iraq and then Afghanistan, China has continued its rise and global terrorism has developed. Internally, within Russia and its near-neighbours, resource wealth has increased (not only via the Stock Market but also from asset prices of gas and oil as well as flows of hot money, from Quantitative Easing policies, seeking better returns), separatist tendencies (Georgia, Chechnya, etc) have been ‘contained’ and Russia has moved on from its post-USSR uncertainty to a developed (or developing) country – one that was granted access to the high table of the G7/G8. Much of this, in no small part, due to the will – or strength – of Putin himself.

   

  So, in Ukraine, we are seeing an expansionist Moscow looking to test the boundaries of the EU/ NATO with Ukraine as the test-bed. Putin has, perhaps wisely, not expressed all-out war to capture all or most of the territory – this would leave absolutely no get out for him and would leave a defeated Putin on the back-foot (an overt war, in Ukraine, between Russia/ Russian Separatists & the West – EU/ NATO/ Ukraine/ US – would be unlikely to have anything but a negative conclusion for Russia). Instead, he is using covert and subterfuge methods to provide insurgent forces with the elements of a long game approach, possibly as a template for other regions (eg. Baltic) and to test the political will of the EU/ NATO. Knowing that focus is on Syria and Iraq, for Putin this is a suitable opportunity to test capabilities on another flank of the Wests’ borders.. Crucially, as long as Ukraine is not in NATO Putin is unlikely to replicate the Ukrainian events in, say, the Baltics (members of NATO). Rather, a non-NATO Ukraine will be likely to continue to be the focus of his expansionist agenda for the foreseeable future, especially as ground has already been made there (Crimea and the East/ South East).                [6 October 2014]