The Middle East: 2014

Iranian allies?: An intriguing recent development in the war against IS/ISIS/ISIL has been that of the role played by Iran, on the military front, against ISIL. On the ground, Iranian militia have been very active in Iraq (and, no doubt, Syria) on the one hand supporting fellow Shia where they have been under threat from ISIL – but also helping to reinforce the pro-Assad forces against not only the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but also elements of Al-Qaida, ISIL and other pro-Sunni groups.

In the air, coordination between the US and allies has seen, effectively, Iranian forces following-up western air strikes with ground attacks against strategic targets as well as, the reverse, Iranian forces spearheading attacks to soften up targets for western strikes. As far as we are aware, no Iranian jets have been reported – a step too far that would be seen as active incursion into western/ Iraqi sovereignty beyond the tacit agreement made so far.

So, what does this tell us? Is this the beginning of a regional alliance that will continue for years or decades to come – or purely a tactical alignment of forces that will end when ISIL is no longer a threat? In part, the last element of the equation – ISIL – will be a key determinate. The mutual threat, from ISIL, outweighs – at the moment – the differences that Iran and the ‘West’ (mainly the US and the UK) have had in the past. A more conducive Iranian regime (Ahmadinejad having given way to more amenable leadership), combined with a willingness to talk more with the West (the ongoing nuclear discussions no doubt providing a parallel route for diplomatic dialogue) have helped – as well as Obama’s second and final term as President resulting in a desire for legacy-building and a greater opportunity to build alliances, with American forces having left Afghanistan and (until recently) Iraq.

Will this alliance last? In the medium term, the US would not want to favour Shia Iran over (for example) Sunni Saudi – as a general regional political move – preferring a balance of powers in the region, but it won’t harm US interests to reach out to Iran, particularly with Sunni extremism (in the form of ISIL and Al Qaida) being associated, rightly or wrongly, with Sunni leadership in countries such as Saudi and Qatar.. For the longer term, US (and Iranian) interests are diverse - the US refocusing on the Asia Pacific region, geo-strategically, and the Middle East appearing as a military/ ideological thorn in its side. For Iran, interests lie in the region and the ongoing tussle with Sunni ideology and Sunni-led countries for regional dominance, as well as shoring up allies – such as Assad, in Syria, and Hezbollah as a counter to Israel. As a result, the current uneasy alliance with the US – and Western allies – is unlikely to last, long term, although the further actions of ISIL will be a key outcome in determining the duration and depth of any further association.                                                                                                [6 January 2015]

• De-nuclearizing Iran: Following recent talks the deadline for a deal on de-nuclearizing weaponry in Iran has been pushed back to next year. For the powers involved (Iran, EU, USA, Russia) this saves the political impact of a perhaps rushed and incomplete agreement being implemented to a later and hopefully more agreeable timeframe when any remaining differences can be ironed out and the unknown future will be more conducive.

  As it is, relations between Iran and the US/ EU are on a better footing than they have been for some years – in part due to short term unity over the threat from Sunni IS/ ISIS/ ISIL but also from a gradual thawing in diplomatic relations over many years. That is not to say that, in isolation, the rhetoric of the ‘axis of evil’ and the ‘great Satan’ - applied respectively to Iran and the US - is no more but rather that at an inter-governmental level there is a more pragmatic approach.. The reaction of Israel, capable and quite probably ready to attack Iran should it pose a sufficient existential threat by way of nuclear weaponry, is as always key regionally and any agreement would have to be as good as accepted or vetoed by the Israelis. Russia, Iran’s ally against the US and the EU in this matter, will provide sufficient support to Iran to assist in a reasonable outcome – but is unlikely to block matters in what is a relatively straightforward agreement in principle.

   

  The wider question, perhaps, is how the region would develop with a non-nuclear Iran? With India, Pakistan and China (as well as North Korea) all nuclear capable, for how long will Iran be able to – overtly or covertly – maintain a non-nuclear stance?              [30 November 2014]

• Why ISIS is different: Why is ISIS seen as such a threat – on a different order to, say, Al-Qaida or North Korea? In part, as it has seemingly developed so rapidly, the power it has acquired (both hard and soft power) has become exponentially greater, in proportion to its size, than many previous terrorist groups or State actors. What do we mean by this? It has acquired significant financial (money) and resource (oil, people, etc) power – as well as obvious military strength (ie. force projection) - with, at least initially, no obvious counterweight to its regional growth. In addition, it has been able to use media (particularly social media) to project a global image that far outweighs its size and strength. Hence, it appears exponentially larger than the sum of its parts. However, in addition, it poses a cross-border threat.

  Unlike, say, North Korea – contained within its borders – ISIS not only has impact across Iraq and Syria, but also could threaten the borders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and – potentially – Iran.. It is already in conflict with the semi-autonomous Kurds and could draw in additional Sunni and Shia militia forces to a wider cross-border warzone extending as indicated above. In addition, the wider/ global threat of exporting trained terrorists back to their country of origin provides the group with Al-Qaida like qualities with State-like geography.

  This ‘double-whammy’ means ISIS is, effectively, a new evolution of the former terrorist group with – for the moment – a cross borders geographical heartland.                         [6 October 2014]